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Modifications to the Traditional Public
Forum Doctrine: United States v.
Kokinda and Its Aftermath
By MICHAEL J. MELLIS*
Introduction
In June 1990, the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Kokinda upheld the conviction of two National Democratic Policy Com-
mittee volunteer workers for soliciting contributions on a sidewalk adja-
cent to the Bowie, Maryland, United States Post Office.1 The defendants
argued that the United States Postal Service regulation prohibiting solici-
tation on post office property violated their First Amendment rights to
free speech in a public forum.2 Writing for the plurality, Justice
O'Connor determined that the sidewalk connecting the post office park-
ing lot to the post office building is a nonpublic forum.3 The Court found
that the United States Postal Service regulation was reasonable as applied
to defendants' expressive activities in a nonpublic forum.4 Justice Ken-
nedy, concurring in the judgment, found the regulation as a reasonable
restriction on the time, place, and manner of expression on post office
sidewalks regardless of the sidewalk's First Amendment status.' Writing
for the dissent, Justice Brennan argued in favor of striking down the reg-
ulation after reaching the opposite conclusion that a post office sidewalk,
like a street sidewalk, is a traditional public forum.6
* Judicial Clerk to the Honorable John R. Bartels, United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, 1991-92. B.A., Williams College, 1987; J.D., Harvard Law
School, 1991. The author would like to thank Aimee Weiss and Michael Parker Boudett for
their assistance in reviewing this article.
1. 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990). See infra Part II for analysis of Kokinda.
2. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3118. See infra Part I for general analysis of First Amendment
public forum jurisprudence.
3. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3120-21. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White and
Scalia joined the plurality opinion. See infra notes 34-43 and accompanying text for discus-
sion of the nonpublic forum doctrine.
4. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3121-25.
5. Id at 3125-26 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
6. Id. at 3127-39 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens
joined the dissenting opinion. See infra notes 14-23 and accompanying text for discussion of
the traditional public forum doctrine.
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Kokinda is the Court's most recent application of the First Amend-
ment public forum doctrines. The public forum doctrines calibrate the
level of judicial review imposed on government regulations of expressive
activity according to the type of public property on which a speaker ex-
presses him or herself.7 Prior to Kokinda, the Court had found munici-
pal sidewalks and streets to be traditional public forums." The
traditional public forum test as applied in these cases focused on objec-
tively determined traditional and historical uses of public places by
citizens.9
Kokinda modifies the traditional public forum test by analyzing gov-
ernment's subjective purposes behind the construction and maintenance
of a post office sidewalk in order to determine whether or not it is a
traditional public forum.1° In this respect, Kokinda adds highly restric-
tive criteria to the public forum calculus. Fewer public places can classify
as traditional public forums when a court is required to focus on govern-
ment's subjective purposes for building and maintaining particular public
places. Kokinda's shift of criteria in analyzing public forums signals a
more restrictive notion of what constitutes a traditional public forum.
Eight months after Kokinda was decided, in International Society
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON) v. Lee, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Kokinda alters First Amend-
ment traditional public forum analysis." The Lee court applied the
Kokinda public forum calculus to determine that lobbies within the Ken-
nedy, LaGuardia, and Newark Airports are not traditional public fo-
rums. 12 Prior to Kokinda, five circuit courts had found airport terminals
to be traditional public forums. 13 Lee demonstrates that Kokinda effects
7. See infra Part I.
8. See Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (streets and sidewalks in a residential neigh-
borhood are public forums), Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (sidewalks in front of embas-
sies in Washington, D.C. are public forums), and United States v. Grace. 461 U.S. 171 (1983)
(sidewalks in front of the United States Supreme Courthouse are public forums). See infra
notes 134-43 and accompanying text for analysis of these cases.
9. Frisby, 487 U.S. 474; Boos, 485 U.S. 312; Grace, 461 U.S. 171.
10. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3119-21.
11. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON) v. Lee, 925 F.2d 576
(2d Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3464 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1992) (No. 91-155). See infra
notes 151-70 and accompanying text for analysis of Lee. See also infra note 208.
12. Lee, 925 F.2d at 581-82.
13. See Jamison v. City of St. Louis, 828 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1987). cert. denied, 485 U.S.
987 (1988) (Lambert-St. Louis International Airport terminals are public forums); United
States Southwest Africa/Namibia Trade and Cultural Council v. United States, 708 F.2d 760,
763-65 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (National and Dulles Airport terminals are public forums); Fernandes
v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 626 (5th Cir. 1981) (Dallas/Ft.Worth Airport terminals are public
forums); Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921, 925-26 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975) (O'Hare Airport terminals are public forums); Kus-
a retrenchment on the First Amendment public forum doctrines and lim-
its citizens' ability to express themselves on various types of publicly
owned property.
Part I of this Article describes briefly the contours of the First
Amendment public forum doctrines prior to Kokinda. Part II outlines
the application of the public forum doctrines in Kokinda. Part III ana-
lyzes how Kokinda modifies the traditional public forum doctrine and
offers the recent opinion in ISKCON v. Lee as an illustration of its future
implications. Part IV critically assesses Kokinda's changes to the tradi-
tional public forum test and suggests an alternative method to balance
the interests of government and speakers without resorting to a narrower
conception of a traditional public forum.
I. Categorizations Under the First Amendment Public Forum
Doctrines Prior to United States v. Kokinda
The Supreme Court's First Amendment public forum doctrine has
its conceptual origin in an oft-quoted portion of Justice Roberts' opinion
in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization.14 In Hague, the
Court held that city officials could not interfere with the Congress of
Industrial Organization's assemblies, speeches and distribution of litera-
ture concerning the National Labor Relations Act on city streets and
parks.15 Justice Roberts, in famous dictum, reasoned that streets and
parks have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time
out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communi-
cating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.
Such use of the streets and public places ... is not absolute, but
relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general
comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good
order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or
denied.16
Justice Roberts' argument that certain public places are protected by the
Constitution in trust for expressive uses-irrespective of government
consent or attempts to interfere with speech-soon became an essential
zynski v. City of Oakland, 479 F.2d 1130, 1131 (9th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (City of Oakland
Airport terminals are public forums). Cf. Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Board of Airport Comm'rs,
785 F.2d 791, 793-5 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd on other grounds, 482 U.S. 569 (1987) (court avoids
passing on the public forum status of Los Angeles International Airport terminals).
14. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
15. Hague, 307 U.S. at 501-07.
16. Id. at 515-16. -
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feature of public forum analysis.
17
The Court first formalized its existing categories of public and non-
public forums in the 1983 opinion of Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n.'8 Writing for the majority in Perry, Justice White di-
vided public property into what were later called "traditional public"
forums, "designated public" forums, and "nonpublic" forums for First
Amendment purposes.'9 Perry defined these three categories and allo-
cated to each a level of judicial scrutiny for government regulation of
speech.20
Perry declared that streets and parks are traditional public forums.
Harkening back to Hague, Justice White observed that streets and parks
are places "which by long tradition or by government fiat have been de-
voted to assembly and debate.... '2 1 In these traditional public forums,
government may enforce "content-based" restrictions on speaker access
only if it can show that its regulation "is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."'  Few
government regulations can satisfy the requirements of this strict level of
judicial review.23
Perry's second category is the designated public forum,24 which is a
17. Justice6 Roberts' dictum was given "impressive content" just months later in Schneider
v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTrrTIoNAL LAW
867 (6th ed. 1986). In Schneider, Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, struck down ordi-
nances prohibiting leafleting on public streets because "streets are natural and proper places
for the dissemination of information and opinion .... ." 308 U.S. at 163. See infra note 60 for
further discussion of Schneider.
Since Schneider, the principles of Hague have been invoked consistently by the Court in
First Amendment cases. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983), Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1969), Jami-
son v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943).
See Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the
Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. RPv. 1713, 1718-58 (1987) for a summary of the rapid evolution
of the First Amendment public forum doctrines.
18. 460 U.S. 37, 45-6 (1983); see also United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3119
(1990). The phrase "public forum" was coined in an important article written by Professor
Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, Sup. Cr. Rnv. 1
(Philip B. Kurland, ed. 1965). See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
19. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 45 (citing Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 469, 515 (1939)).
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) (strict scrutiny is the "most
exacting" form of judicial review under the First Amendment); accord Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S.
312, 321 (1988). See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (citing several "exceptional"
circumstances, including the disclosure during wartime of military deployments, when the
government interests at stake would be sufficiently compelling to justify content-based suppres-
sion of speech).
24. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46-47.
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public place that government has "opened for use by the public as a place
for expressive activity."' 25 Designated public forums include university
meeting facilities,26 school board meetings,
27 and municipal theaters.2
They are functionally equivalent to traditional public forums. Strict scru-
tiny applies to regulations restricting access to these places.29
The Court made an important qualification to its definition of a des-
ignated public forum two years later in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal De-
fense and Education Fund.30 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor
stated that "government does not create a public forum by inaction or by
permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a non-
traditional forum for public discourse., 31 Cornelius greatly contracted
the range of designated public forums by requiring a showing of clear
intent behind government's management of its property. Justice
O'Connor wrote, "[w]e will not find that a public forum has been created
in the face of clear evidence of a contrary intent.., nor will we infer that
the government intended to create a public forum when the nature of the
property is inconsistent with expressive activity. '32 Cornelius thus made
clear that the Court would rarely find the existence of designated public
foruns.
33
The nonpublic forum is the third category of property established in
Perry.34 Perry defined a nonpublic forum as any place not falling within
the traditional or designated public forum classifications. 35 Jails, 36 mili-
tary bases,37 public bus advertising spaces,38 home mailboxes, 39 utility
25. Idk at 45.
26. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
27. City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429
U.S. 167 (1976).
28. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
29. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
30. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
31. Id at 802.
32. Id at 803.
33. See Post, supra note 17, at 1756-57, where the author argues that the Cornelius intent
test is the coup de grace for the designated public forum category. "Cornelius shrinks the
limited public forum to such insignificance that it is difficult to imagine how a plaintiff could
ever successfully prosecute a lawsuit to gain access to such a forum." Id. at 1757. See infra
note 118 and accompanying text.
34. Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
35. Id
36. Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
37. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
38. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
39. United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114
(1981).
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poles," internal school mail systems, 41 and federal employee charity
drives42 all fall under this rubric. Speaker access regulations for nonpub-
lic forums are reviewed by the Court under a reasonableness test.43
While the Court calls its public forum framework "tripartite,"'
commentators include a fourth category called the "limited-purpose" or
the "Perry footnote 7" forum.45 In footnote 7 of Perry, the Court recog-
nized that a place opened for "a limited [expressive] purpose or for the
discussion of certain subjects" would receive a higher level of judicial
review.46 These places are a subset of the designated public forum class
because clear government intent to open the forum for expressive activi-
ties is required. Examples of limited-purpose public forums are school
board meetings or access to university rooms by student groups.47 To
the extent that a limited-purpose public forum is open to expressive ac-
tivities, government regulations will be reviewed with strict scrutiny.4"
The Court has not fully clarified the line between public and non-
public uses of limited-purpose public forums. There are two types of lim-
ited-purpose public forums. The first is temporally delineated as a place
that becomes a full-fledged public forum during a particular period of
time. An example of a temporally limited-purpose public forum is the
school board meeting in City of Madison Joint School District v. Wiscon-
sin Employment Relations Commission.49 During the scheduled meeting
time, the meeting room was a designated public forum.
The second type of limited-purpose forum is conceptually delineated
as a place that becomes a public forum for specific expressive uses. The
Court has not yet squarely ruled on the status of the conceptually lim-
ited-purpose public forum, but a likely example is a municipal bandshell
dedicated to the performing arts.50 Public officials must make decisions
40. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
41. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 37 (1983).
42. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 788 (1985).
43. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 ("the State may reserve the [nonpublic] forum for its intended
purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and
not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view").
44. United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3119 (1990).
45. LOCKHART, supra note 17, at 883; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 12-24, at 986-97 (2d ed. 1988); Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7.
46. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 45-46.
49. 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
50. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) ("We need not here discuss
whether a municipality which owns a bandstand or stage facility may exercise, in some circum-
stances, a proprietary right to select performances and control quality."). Id. at 790. See infra
notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
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concerning who should be permitted access according to the dedicated
purposes of the forum. For example, bandshell officials might decide to
permit access to a symphony orchestra wishing to perform Mozart, but
not to a paramilitary band wanting to perform the Iraqi national anthem.
In Perry, the Court said government could limit access to these places to
speakers of similar "character.""1 However, Perry did not indicate what
level of judicial review these access decisions should receive.5 2 As a re-
sult, two alternative treatments for conceptually limited-purpose public
forums have been proposed by the lower federal courts.53
Regardless of the classification of the forum, the Court will apply
strict scrutiny to any government regulation if it is aimed at suppressing
the viewpoint of a speaker.5" Government may also set reasonable, con-
tent-neutral restrictions on the time, place, and manner of expression for
any public place. These restrictions must be "'narrowly tailored to serve
a significant governmental interest, and ... leave open ample alternative
channels of communication of the information.' "'I Thus, classification
of public property under the public forum doctrines is relevant only to
content-based restrictions.
51. Perry, 460 U.S. at 48.
52. Id.
53. In Deeper Life Christian Fellowship v. Board of Educ., 852 F.2d 676, 679-80 (2d Cir.
1988) (citations omitted), the court stated that "[u]nder the limited public forum analysis,
property remains a nonpublic forum as to all unspecified uses and exclusion of uses--even if
based upon subject matter or the speaker's identity-need only be reasonable and viewpoint
neutral to pass constitutional muster." Thus, the nonpublic forum standard of review would
apply to access decisions made at a conceptually limited-purpose public forum.
Toward A Gayer Bicentennial Comm. v. Rhode Island Bicentennial Found., 417 F. Supp.
632 (D.R.I. 1976) takes a different approach. The court stated that government officials could
restrict access to a conceptually limited-purpose public forum only after using "precise and
clear standards even-handedly applied." Id at 640. Otherwise, the "unbridled" discretion of
government officials would violate the First Amendment under a prior restraint theory. Id at
640-41.
A second open question is whether such access restrictions impose unconstitutional condi-
tions or penalties on speech, see, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), or instead regu-
late permissible selective government subsidies of speech, see eg., Regan v. Taxation With
Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983). See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions,
102 HARv. L. REv. 1415 (1989) for an excellent analysis of this topic.
54. United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3119-25 (1990); see Note, The Content
Distinction In Free Speech Analysis After Renton, 102 HAv. L. REv. 1904, 1913-17 (1989),
for an examination of the troublesome distinctions among subject matter, content, and view-
point discrimination of speech; see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U.
CmI. L. REv. 46 (1987), for an examination of the nature of content-neutral judicial review.
55. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 481 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Commu-
nity for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 243 (1984)). See Note, supra note 54, at 1908;
see also infra notes 197-207 and accompanying text for further discussion of the time, place,
and manner of expression standard of judicial review.
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The designated, limited-purpose, and nonpublic forum classifica-
tions are based on an analogy "to a private property owner exercising
broad dominion over his property. '5 6 The 1897 opinion of Davis v. Mas-
sachusetts succinctly lays out this relationship: "For the legislature to
absolutely or conditionally forbid public speaking in a highway or public
park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public
than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house."51 7 Classi-
fications are made on the basis of government's level of control over its
property. Clear evidence of government's waiver of its power to make
content-based speaker exclusions from public property is necessary to
create a designated or limited-purpose public forum.58 In the absence of
a waiver of property rights, government power in these public places re-
sembles that of a private property owner.
The Hague conception of a traditional public forum is the only cate-
gory that does not require outright government permission or intent to
establish a public forum. 9 Rather, objectively determined, historical,
and traditional uses establish traditional public forums.60 The private
property-based rationales of the other categories do not apply to the
traditional public forum. As such, the traditional public forum is the
only category of First Amendment public forum jurisprudence that can
provide access to speakers independent of government authority.
II. Application of the Public Forum Doctrine in United States
v. Kokinda
On August 6, 1986, Marsha Kokinda and Kevin Pearl, both volun-
teer workers for the National Democratic Policy Committee, set up a
56. C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in First Amendment
Analysis, 55 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 109, 111 (1986).
57. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897). See, eg., United States Postal Serv. v.
Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981) (" '[t]he state, no less than a private
owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it
is lawfully dedicated.' ") (quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) and Adderly v. State of
Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966)).
58. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 803 (1985).
59. Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). See also supra notes 14-16
.and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), striking down ordinances
prohibiting leafleting on public streets under the Hague public forum theory set out just
months earlier. Schneider recognized that the "primary purpose to which.., streets are dedi-
cated" is for the "movement of people and property." Id. at 160. Despite government's ac-
knowledged purposes for operating streets, Hague's objective criteria led the Court to
invalidate the regulation because "streets are the natural and proper places for the dissemina-
tion of information and opinion .. " Id. at 163. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying
text for discussion of the Hague public forum theory.
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card table on the sidewalk in front of the Bowie, Maryland, United States
Post Office.6 From this table, Kokinda and Pearl distributed literature
to and solicited contributions from passers-by on behalf of the political
organization.62 The table was situated on a seven-foot wide sidewalk that
runs along the entire length of the post office and separates it from its
parking lot. Nearby, a second sidewalk separates the parking lot from
Route 197, the road adjacent to the Bowie Post Office.63
Between forty or fifty Bowie Post Office patrons complained about
the presence of Kokinda and Pearl to Post Office employees." The
Bowie Postmaster requested that Kokinda and Pearl leave, but they re-
fused to do so. Postal Inspectors then arrested them for violating 39
Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) section 232.1(h)(1) (1989), a
United States Post Office regulation aimed at curbing solicitation on post
office property.65 The regulation reads in pertinent part: "[S]oliciting
alms and contributions, campaigning for election to any public office, col-
lecting private debts, commercial soliciting and vending, and displaying
or distributing commercial advertising on postal premises are
prohibited.
66
Kokinda and Pearl were tried and convicted of violating 39 C.F.R.
section 232.1(h)(1) by a United States magistrate in the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland.67 The defendants appealed
their convictions to the district court, arguing that the regulation vio-
61. United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. CL 3115, 3116 (1990).
62. Id Political and charitable solicitation are forms of expression recognized under the
First Amendment. See Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 788-
89 (1988), Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 959-61 (1984),
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 628-29 (1980).
In contrast, whether begging is a form of expression protected by the First Amendment is
an unresolved question. Cf. Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 154, cert.
denied, I11 S. Ct. 516 ("[tlhe only message... common to all acts of begging is that beggars
want to exact money from those whom they accost... [and this] ... falls far outside the scope
of protected speech under the First Amendment") and Blair v. Shanahan, No. C-89-4176
WHO, 1991 U.S. Dist. Lexis 15300, at *19-21 (N.D. Cal. 1991) ("[b]egging can promote the
very speech values that entitle charitable appeals to constitutional protection.... That the
beggar represents himself and not an organized charity should not render his speech unpro-
tected"). See Helen Hershkoff and Adam S. Cohen, Begging to Differ: The First Amendment
and the Right to Beg, 104 HARv. L. REv. 896 (1991), for the argument that begging should be
protected under the First Amendment.
63. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3117-18; see also Brief for the United States at 4-5, United
States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990) (No. 88-2031).
64. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3118.
65. 39 C.F.R. § 232.1(h)(1) (1990).
66. I ; see also Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3118.
67. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3118. They were also convicted of refusing to comply with the
lawful directives of postal authorities to leave postal service property under 39 C.F.R.
§ 232.1(d) (1990).
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lated the First Amendment as applied to speakers expressing themselves
in a public forum. The district court affirmed the convictions.68
Kokinda received a ten day prison sentence and a fine of $50. Pearl re-
ceived a thirty day suspended sentence and a fine of $100.69
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed
the convictions after holding that the post office sidewalk on which the
defendants solicited is a traditioinal public forum.70 The court explicitly
declined to make "intricate" distinctions between various types of public
'sidewalks. 7' The court reasoned that both post office sidewalks and mu-
nicipal sidewalks are public thoroughfares because they direct and chan-
nel pedestrian traffic and are open and accessible to anyone.72 Harkening
back to the trust theory of Hague,7" the Fourth Circuit recounted how
historically sidewalks have been the site of picketing, demonstrations,
and other forms of political protest.74 To the Fourth Circuit, a public
sidewalk is a public sidewalk, and citizens should not have to "wonder"
about its First Amendment status.
75
Applying the strict scrutiny standard of judicial review to 39 C.F.R.
section 232.1(h)(1), the court found that the regulation banned an entire
category of protected speech-political solicitation-from post office
property. This categorical ban was too broad to satisfy the "narrowly
tailored" requirement of strict scrutiny review for public forums.76 The
Fourth Circuit alternatively held that the regulation was not a valid re-
striction on the time, place, and manner of expression for the same
reasons.
77
The Fourth Circuit's decision that post office sidewalks are tradi-
tional public forums conflicted with the rulings of two other circuits.
The Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Belsky,78 and the Third Circuit
in United States v. Bjerke,79 held that post office sidewalks are nonpublic
forums, and affirmed convictions based on 39 C.F.R. section 232.1h)(1).
68. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3118.
69. Id..
70. United States v. Kokinda, 866 F.2d 699, 701-03 (4th Cir. 1989).
71. Id at 702.
72. Id
73. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
74. Kokinda, 866 F.2d at 701. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
75. Id at 702.
76. Id at 705. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
77. Id. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
78. 799 F.2d 1485 (11th Cir. 1986). Note that the defendants in Belsky were also solicit-
ing on behalf of the National Democratic Policy Committee. Id at 1487.
79. 796 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1986). The defendants in Bjerke were also soliciting on behalf
of the National Democratic Policy Committee. Id at 645.
[Vol. 19:167
The United States Supreme Court granted the United States' petition for
a writ of certiorari in Kokinda because of the conflict among the Third,
Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits. 0
The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision and rein-
stated the convictions of Kokinda and Pearl.8" Justice O'Connor, writ-
ing for the plurality of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and
Scalia, decided that the Bowie, Maryland, Post Office sidewalk is neither
a traditional nor a designated public forum.8 2 Justice O'Connor hinted
that the postal sidewalk might be a limited-purpose public forum, but not
for the purposes of political solicitation.8" Consequently, the postal side-
walk fell into the nonpublic forum category, and the Post Office regula-
tion passed the reasonableness standard ofjudicial review for a nonpublic
forum.
8 4
The plurality said that the post office sidewalk is not a traditional
public forum.8 5 Justice O'Connor argued that the sidewalk "does not
have the characteristics of public sidewalks traditionally open to expres-
sive activity."8 6 The Court had previously held that public sidewalks in
front of the Supreme Court, 7 embassies in Washington, D.C., 8 and in
residential neighborhoods, 9 were traditional public forums. The Court
distinguished Kokinda from these cases by arguing that "mere" physical
similarities between the post office sidewalk and the municipal sidewalk
nearby "cannot dictate forum analysis."90 Unlike municipal public side-
walks, the post office sidewalk leads only from the parking lot to an en-
trance of the post office.9 Postal sidewalks are "constructed solely to
80. The Ninth Circuit in 1987 held that a post office sidewalk was a nonpublic forum in
Monterey County Democratic Central Comm. v. United States Postal Serv., 812 F.2d 1194
(9th Cir. 1987). The Supreme Court presumably did not cite Monterey County in Kokinda
because it dealt with Post Office guidelines governing voter registration drives on post office
property. The Seventh Circuit considered but declined to decide whether a post office sidewalk
is a public forum in National Anti-Drug Coalition v. Bolger, 737 F.2d 717, 723 (7th Cir. 1984).
81. United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3125 (1990).
82. Id at 3119-21.
83. Id at 3121. See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
84. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3121-25.
85. Id at 3120-21.
86. Id at 3120.
87. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983). See infra notes 134-36 and accompany-
ing text.
88. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988). See infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
89. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988). See infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
90. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3120.
91. Id.; compare United States v. Bjerke, 796 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1986) in which the court
wrote that the post office sidewalk is within an "enclave separated from the public thorough-
fare." Id at 649. Bjerke then analogized the post office sidewalk to the nonpublic forum mili-
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provide for the passage of individuals engaged in postal business."9 2
Traditional public forum sidewalks, in contrast, more closely function as
public streets and thoroughfares. The plurality concluded under this rea-
soning that the postal sidewalk is not a traditional public forum.9"
The Supreme Court in Kokinda modified the traditional public fo-
rum test and diverged sharply from the Fourth Circuit's methodology.
As stated in Part I, the traditional public forum test is grounded in the
trust theory set out in Hague, which does not turn on whether govern-
ment intends specifically to designate a public space for a particular
use.94 Hague rests instead on traditional uses of public property by citi-
zens.95 The-Kokinda plurality glossed over the Hague principle by dis-
counting the Fourth Circuit's analysis concerning traditional uses of
public sidewalks and amici brief descriptions of the multi-faceted histori-
cal uses of post office property. 96 Instead, the Court used government's
subjective purposes for having postal sidewalks to determine that they
are not traditional public forums 9 7 Justice O'Connor wrote that the
Postal Service built the sidewalk "solely" for the purpose of providing
access for post office patrons.98 Furthermore, the Court later remarked
that the "purpose of the forum in this case is to accomplish the most
efficient and effective postal delivery system." 99
tary reservation in Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976). See infra notes 126-31 and
accompanying text.
92. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3120.
93. The Court wrote that the postal sidewalk is not "the traditional public forum sidewalk
referred to in Perry." Id. at 3120. In fact, Perry does not concern a sidewalk; rather, it ana-
lyzed the First Amendment status of internal school mailboxes. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
94. Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). See also supra notes 14-17
and accompanying text.
95. Id at 515-16. See infra notes 125-43 for description of prior Supreme Court cases
applying Hague's objective analysis to sidewalks and streets.
96. See United States v. Kokinda, 866 F.2d 699, 701.02 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Amicus
Curiae Brief of Newport News Daily Press & Times Herald, Richmond Times-Dispatch and
News Leader, USA Today, and The Washington Post in Support of the Respondents at 7-8,
United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990) (No. 88-2031), describing how post offices
have served as regional gathering places for news dissemination, distribution of newspapers,
general stores, and pubs. Today, many United States Post Offices have facsimile machines,
automatic teller machines, and selective service and passport processing capabilities. The amici
thus argued that while the functions of federal post offices change, they remain multi-faceted
and reach well beyond the scope of mail delivery.
97. United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3120 (1990); compare United States v.
Belsky, 799 F.2d 1485, 1489 (11th Cir. 1986), in which the court wrote, "the ingress and
egress walkways... are intended to accommodate traffic to and from the post office and have
not traditionally been sites for expressive conduct."
98. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3120.
99. Id. at 3122.
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Justice Brennan in Kokinda, writing one of his last dissenting opin-
ions as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, noted this inconsis-
tency with Hague. He observed, "why the sidewalk was built is not
salient" under the traditional public forum definition."° Justice Brennan
also asserted that under Hague, the "architectural idiosyncracies" of the
Bowie Post Office and its access sidewalks are not determinative of its
status as a traditional public forum.10 1 The plurality's attempt to distin-
guish among different types of sidewalks and streets on the basis of their
respective architectural features is only a roundabout way of showing
government's subjective purposes behind building them in the first
place.1"2 Open public access and traditional historical uses of a public
place are the objective criteria underlying the Hague rule. To the dissent,
an outdoor post office sidewalk is properly classified as a traditional pub-
lic forum under the parameters of Hague. 103
Justice Kennedy, although concurring with the plurality, agreed
with Justice Brennan's observation that the plurality opinion threatens
the Hague traditional public forum test. He warned that, "[i]f our public
forum jurisprudence is to retain vitality, we must recognize that certain
objective characteristics of Government property and its customary use
by the public may control the case.""w Justice Kennedy's reference here
to the objective criteria of the Hague test indicates that he disapproves of
the Kokinda plurality's inclusion of government's subjective intent in the
traditional public forum calculus. However, because Justice Kennedy
thought 39 C.F.R. section 232.1(h)(1) was a reasonable restriction on the
time, place, and manner of expression, he avoided passing on the public
forum status of the sidewalk.
10 5
Kokinda also decided whether the post office sidewalk is a desig-
nated public forum. 06 Designated public forums exist only when the
government clearly intended to create them. 107 The Court had little
trouble dispensing with this issue in relation to the post office sidewalk.
The respondents could put forth no evidence that the United States Pos-
tal Service expressly intended to create access sidewalks for solicita-
tion.108 The Court consequently held that the sidewalk does not fall
100. Id. at 3129 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
101. Id
102. Id
103. Id at 3128-32.
104. Id at 3125.
105. Id at 3125-26; 39 C.F.R. § 232.1 (h)(1) (1989).
106. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3121.
107. See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
108. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3121. See supra notes 32, 58 and accompanying text.
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within this category. 10 9
Since Cornelius, the designated public forum test is so narrow that
even an official "practice of allowing some speech activities on postal
property does not add up to the dedication of postal property to speech
activities."110 Prior to 1978, the Postal Service allowed certain groups to
use postal facilities for fund-raising and solicitation.1 39 C.F.R. section
232.1(h)(1) banned solicitation from postal premises in 1978. This regu-
latory change was sufficient reason for the Court to conclude that the
Postal Service does not presently intend to open up its sidewalks for so-
licitation.1 2 This aspect of Kokinda illustrates the extent to which the
Court, in applying the public forum doctrines, emphasized the proprie-
tary interests of government.
1 1 3
Nevertheless, Post Office regulations do permit other types of First
Amendment activities on Post Office sidewalks. For example, 39 C.F.R.
section 232.1(h)(1) does not ban pure speech or the distribution of
printed political leaflets on postal property.1 14 But, as one commentator
has observed, the "policy of selective access ... itself becomes evidence
that government did not intend open access. . ." at the forum.'1 5 The
Kokinda dissent criticized the plurality for applying "self-justifying""' 6
logic because " '[t]he very fact that the Government denied access to the
speaker indicates that the Government did not intend to provide an open
forum for expressive activity, and under the Court's analysis that fact
alone would demonstrate that the forum is not a limited public fo-
rum.' 5117 That the Cornelius intent test amounted to the coup de grace
for the designated public forum is substantiated by this portion of
Kokinda."8
Because postal sidewalks are open to certain kinds of expressive ac-
tivity, but not to solicitation, the Kokinda plurality limited the reach of
its holding to solicitation. Justice O'Connor remarked, "[e]ven conceding
109. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3121.
110. Id.
111. See Brief for the United States at 14, United States v. Kokinda, 110 U.S. 47 (1989)
(No. 88-2031).
112. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3121-22. It is simply unclear how much speech on public
property government would have to permit before it rises to the level of government intent as
required in Cornelius. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
114. Moreover, 39 C.F.R. § 232.1(o) allows posting public notices on certain post office
bulletin boards. 39 C.F.R. § 232.1(o) (1989).
115. Dienes, supra note 56, at 119.
116. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3132.
117. Id. at 3133 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 825 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
118. Post, supra note 17, at 1757. See supra note 33.
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that the forum here has been dedicated to some First Amendment uses,
and thus is not a purely non-public forum, under Perry, regulation of the
reserved non-public uses would still require application of the reasona-
bleness test." '19 Kokinda draws conceptual distinctions among catego-
ries of expressive activity-such as solicitation versus political
leafleting-and analyzes each with respect to government's clear intent
behind creation and maintenance of the public place in question. Thus,
the postal sidewalk might very well be a designated public forum for
political speech, but not for political solicitation. This reasoning resem-
bles the description of a limited-purpose public forum alluded to in foot-
note 7 of Peny.120 While not expressly classifying the postal sidewalk as
such, Kokinda appears to mark the first Supreme Court decision, since
the formal inception of the public forum categories in Perry, to find the
existence of a conceptually limited-purpose public forum.1 21
Having ruled out the traditional and designated forum categories,
the Court held ipso facto that the postal sidewalk is a nonpublic fo-
rum. 2 This classification places a postal sidewalk on a par with military
bases, jails and other nonpublic forums. 23 Government's power is great-
est to regulate speech in nonpublic forums because judicial review polices
only for unreasonable regulations. The Court had no difficulty in finding
that 39 C.F.R. section 232.1(h)(1) is a reasonable regulation of speech on
non-public forum property.
124
HI. United States v. Kokinda's Modifications to the Traditional
Public Forum Doctrine and Their Aftermath
Government intent behind construction or maintenance of a public
place did not, until Kokinda, figure into the traditional public forum
calculus. The Hague public forum definition, not cited by the plurality in
Kokinda, focuses on the uses of property rather than the purposes behind
its existence. 125 Thus, Kokinda signals a shift toward a more restrictive
understanding of the traditional public forum concept. A brief survey of
prior Supreme Court cases dealing with the First Amendment status of
streets and sidewalks substantiates the observation that Kokinda adds
highly restrictive subjective criteria to the traditional public forum test.
119. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3121.
120. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 n.7 (1983). See
supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
122. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3121.
123. See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
124. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3121-25.
125. Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
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In Greer v. Spock, the Court held that the military enclave of Fort
Dix, New Jersey, is a nonpublic forum. 12 6 The defendants were evicted
and barred from re-entering the Fort Dix Military Reservation pursuant
to military regulations prohibiting political activities there.' 27 The de-
fendants, who were political campaign volunteers, argued that streets
and sidewalks within the enclave were public forums because Fort Dix
had permitted access to civilians.1 28 The Court was quick to dismiss this
claim because under Hague, the "notion that federal military reserva-
tions, like municipal streets and parks, have traditionally served as a
place for free public assembly and communication [is] .. .historically
and constitutionally false."' 29 Greer stressed the special constitutional
status of military functions to reach this conclusion.
130
As one commentator has written, Greer "did not examine the partic-
ular attributes of Fort Dix, but rather inquired into abstract properties of
military installations. Its conclusion was therefore generic: a 'military
installation like Fort Dix' was not a public forum."'' 31 The Greer deci-
sion did not focus on the Fort Dix sidewalks or streets, but rather on the
abstract First Amendment status of military bases in general. The pur-
poses behind the construction of the walkways within Fort Dix were ir-
relevant to Greer's traditional public forum analysis.
Similarly, the Court relied on the Hague concept of historical and
traditional uses of public places in Heffron v. International Society for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON), which upheld as reasonable a
time, place, and manner of expression restriction on solicitation at the
Minnesota State Fair.' 32 In distinguishing fairground passageways from
streets, Heffron described a public street as "continually open, often un-
congested,.., a necessary conduit in the daily affairs of a locality's citi-
zens,... a place where people may enjoy the open air or the company of
friends and neighbors in a relaxed environment."' 33 Heffron focused on
the objectively ascertained, traditional public uses of streets and side-
walks by citizens rather than on government's subjective motivations for
building them.
126. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
127. Id. at 828-34.
128. Id. at 835-37.
129. IM at 838.
130. Id
131. Post, supra note 17, at 1741.
132. 452 U.S. 640 (1981). See infra notes 201-04 and accompanying text for further discus-
sion of Heffron.
133. Ifeffron, 452 U.S. at 651.
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The Court continued to apply Hague's traditional use analysis in
United States v. Grace, which invalidated a statute prohibiting all leaflet-
ing and picketing on the sidewalk adjacent to the Supreme Court build-
ing in Washington, D.C.13 4 Grace concluded that the Supreme Court
sidewalk was, like any other sidewalk, a traditional public forum.'35 Jus-
tice White remarked, "[s]idewalks, of course, are among those areas of
public property that traditionally have been held open to the public for
expressive activities and are clearly within those areas of public property
that may be considered, generally without further inquiry, to be public
forum property."' 36 Once again, the Court did not enter into an inquiry
concerning the purposes behind the construction of municipal sidewalks
in front of the Supreme Court to reach this decision.
In Boos v. Barry, the Court partially invalidated a Washington, D.C.
ordinance prohibiting the display of any sign within 500 feet of a foreign
embassy that tends to bring the foreign government into "public odium"
or "public disrepute."' 37 In a majority opinion written by Justice
O'Connor, Boos held that the public streets and sidewalks outside embas-
sies are traditional public forums. 3 ' As in Greer, Heffron, and Grace,
Boos did not factor into its traditional public forum determination the
purposes behind government operation of these sidewalks and streets.
39
Most importantly, the Court in 1988 rejected an invitation to ana-
lyze the specific purposes and functions of a particular public street or
sidewalk in Frisby v. Shultz."4° Frisby upheld a Brookfield, Wisconsin,
ordinance prohibiting picketing "before or about" any residence. 141
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor stated, "[n]o particularized
inquiry into the precise nature of a specific street is necessary; all public
streets are held in the public trust and are properly considered traditional
public fora."'14 Justice O'Connor emphasized that since the Hague rule
is based on historical understandings of the uses of streets, "a public
street does not lose its status as a traditional public forum simply because
it runs through a residential neighborhood".., or because it is physically
narrow. 1
43
134. 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
135. Id at 171-72.
136. Id at 179.
137. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
138. Id
139. Id.
140. 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988).
141. Id. at 477.
142. Id. at 481.
143. Id at 480.
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These factually similar precedents demonstrate that the essential
features of the traditional public forum test, until Kokinda, were the
traditional and historical uses of public property. Kokinda, written by
Justice O'Connor just two years after her majority opinion in Frisby, in-
stead directs its analysis to the purposes, architectural characteristics,
and functions behind specific public places. Justice Brennan pointed out
in his dissent that even public streets and parks could be reclassified
under these criteria because they are not built for the purpose of expres-
sive activity. 1" Kokinda's modification of the traditional public forum
doctrine could substantially curtail the types of places classified as tradi-
tional public forums if taken to its logical conclusion.
Kokinda borrows from the criteria of the designated public forum
test because it relies heavily on government's subjective intent and pur-
poses behind construction of a public place. As described in Part I, the
designated public forum test turns on government's intent behind crea-
tion of a particular public place. 45 Examining the purposes behind and
architectural functions of a postal sidewalk is an indirect way of applying
the intent-based analysis of the designated public forum test. Thus, the
Kokinda plurality fused the subjectively based strictures of the desig-
nated forum test into the objectively based traditional public forum
calculus.
As stated in Part I, the designated, limited-purpose, and nonpublic
forum categories are based on analogies to private property rights of ex-
clusion.'46 Kokinda carried over these private property-based rationales
as it fused the definitions of the designated and traditional public forum.
The plurality repeatedly emphasized the commercial, private property-
like interests of the Postal Service in reaching its holding. For example,
the Court prefaced its opinion by characterizing Post Office activities as
government functioning not as a lawmaker or licensor, but rather as a
"proprietor."' 47 The Court later observed, "[t]he purpose of the forum
in this case is to accomplish the most efficient and effective postal deliv-
ery system."'148 Moreover, the lower federal court postal sidewalk cases
expressed similar concerns that the Postal Service be able to carry out its
144. United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3129 (1990). To illustrate this point fur-
ther, the public street described in Heffron is not constructed and maintained by a municipality
so that "people [could] enjoy the open air or the company of friends and neighbors in a relaxed
environment." Heffron v. ISKCON, 452 U.S. 640, 651 (1981). See also supra note 60 and
accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
147. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3119. See infra notes 175-92 and accompanying text.
148. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3122.
commercial functions without serious disruption.14 9
By borrowing from the designated forum test, the Kokinda plurality
relied heavily on its correlative private property-based rationales. These
rationales helped to justify the Court's goal of insulating the post offices
from commercial "disruption" and "delay" caused by solicitors on post
office sidewalks. 150 This explanation accounts for Kokinda's merger of
the designated public forum test into the Hague traditional public forum
classification.
In February 1991, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
ISKCON v. Lee observed that Kokinda "alters" public forum analysis by
engaging in a "detailed" analysis of the purposes behind the construction
and maintenance of particular public places. 51 Lee applied Kokinda's
modified traditional public forum test and held that airport terminal lob-
bies are not traditional public forums for solicitation purposes. Like the
Kokinda plurality, Lee deferred to the government when acting as a pro-
prietor over commercially dedicated public space.1 52 The Second Circuit
justified its use of a subjective purpose test as part of First Amendment
traditional public forum analysis on the basis of private property-based
analogies.
1 5 3
In Lee, ISKCON contended that the lobbies in the Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey airports, including John F. Kennedy, La
Guardia, and Newark International Airports, are traditional public fo-
rums. 54 ISKCON, whose devotees wished to solicit religious contribu-
tions from airport pedestrians, argued that Port Authority regulations
prohibiting the distribution of literature and the solicitation and receipt
of funds inside air terminals should not withstand strict judicial
149. See United States v. Bjerke, 796 F.2d 643, 649 (3d Cir. 1986) and United States v.
Belsky, 799 F.2d 1485, 1489 (11th Cir. 1986).
150. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3124.
151. 925 F.2d 576, 580-81 (2d Cir. 1991), cert granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3464 (U.S. Jan. 10,
1992) (No. 91-155).
152. Id at 580-82.
153. Ad at 581-82. See infra notes 162-70 and accompanying text.
154. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority) is a bi-state
agency created in 1921 by an interstate compact approved by Congress to develop interstate
public transportation and commerce. Act of Aug. 23, 1921, ch. 77, 42 Stat. 174 (1921), con-
senting to 1921 N.J. Laws 151 and 1921 N.Y. Laws 154. The Port Authority owns and oper-
ates the John F. Kennedy International Airport, LaGuardia Airport, and Newark
International Airport. Walter Lee, the late Superintendent of the Port Authority Police, was
officially charged with enforcement of Port Authority regulations. Lee remains designated as
defendant-appellant because a permanent replacement has not been appointed.
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scrutiny.1 55
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York found that air terminal lobbies are traditional public forums be-
cause they "possess the characteristics of a bustling metropolitan
boulevard."' 15 6 The court struck down the Port Authority regulations by
applying strict scrutiny. 5 7 The Port Authority appealed, and the Second
Circuit reversed the decision with respect to solicitation. 58
Kokinda was so influential in the Second Circuit's reversal that the
court remarked, that but for the decision "this panel was prepared to
follow the authority established in other circuits" concerning the First
Amendment status of airport terminals.1 9 For example, in Fernandes v.
Limmer, the Fifth Circuit held that the Dallas/Ft. Worth Airport termi-
nal lobbies are traditional public forums, reasoning that "[t]he parallel
between public streets and . . . the central concourses of the
D[allas]/F[t.] W[orth] terminal buildings, where air travellers as well as
the general public may shop, dine, imbibe, and sightsee, is clear and pow-
erful .... 160 Similarly, in Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chi-
cago, the Seventh Circuit wrote that airport terminals are "spacious, city-
owned common areas which resemble those public thoroughfares which
have been long recognized to be particularly appropriate places for the
exercise of constitutionally protected rights to communicate ideas and
information."1'' The Second Circuit argued that Kokinda discarded the
155. Lee, 925 F.2d at 578-79. ISKCON challenged Airport Rules and Regulations, The
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Chapter III, as amended by resolution dated
February 11, 1988, which read in pertinent part:
B. Non-commercial activity at Port Authority air terminals which are not occupied
by a lessee, licensee or permittee is subject to the following conditions and restric-
tions:
(1) The following conduct is prohibited within the interior areas of build-
ings or structures at an air terminal if conducted by a person to or with passers-by in
a continuous or repetitive manner:...
(b) The sale or distribution of flyers, brochures, pamphlets, books or
any other printed or written material.
(c) The solicitation and receipt of funds.
156. ISKCON v. Lee, 721 F.Supp. 572, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
157. Id. at 579.
158. Lee, 925 F.2d at 582. Lee affirmed the portion of the district court's holding that the
Port Authority regulation prohibiting the distribution of literature violated the First Amend-
ment. Id. See Longo v. United States Postal Serv., 761 F. Supp. 220 (D. Conn. 1991) (relying
in part on this portion of Lee to strike down 39 C.F.R. § 232.1(h)(1), prohibiting political
campaigning on post office property, as an unreasonable regulation against expressive activity
on a nonpublic forum post office sidewalk).
159. Lee, 925 F.2d at 580. See supra note 13 for a list of circuit court cases conflicting with
Lee.
160. Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 627 (5th Cir. 1981).
161. Chicago Area Military Project v: City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921, 925 (7th Cir. 1975).
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traditional public forum methodology of cases like Fernandes, Chicago
Area Military Project, and Frisby in favor of a detailed inquiry into the
purposes behind public places.162
Lee determined that the numerous similarities between a prototypi-
cal public street and the Port Authority airport lobbies-which have
banks, restaurants, boutiques, shops, and art exhibits--cannot influence
traditional public forum analysis.163 Rather, the purpose behind creation
of the air terminals controls the traditional public forum test.1 4 Lee
characterized Port Authority airports as commercial enterprises by stat-
ing that "Kennedy, La Guardia and Newark are funded by user fees and
operated so as to make a regulated profit."1 6' The Lee court concluded
that the terminals are "intended solely to facilitate a particular type of
transaction-air travel-unrelated to protected expression."1 66 With
such a proprietary/commercial purpose in mind, the terminals were held
to be nonpublic forums for solicitation by ISKCON devotees.' 67
The similarities between Kokinda and Lee are significant. Both
opinions focused on government's subjective intent behind operating
public spaces. Like Kokinda, Lee's First Amendment traditional public
forum analysis was dominated by government's interests as a commercial
proprietor. Both cases merged the subjective purpose test of the desig-
nated public forum into the objective analysis formerly reserved for the
traditional public forum. The government-as-proprietor rationale-in
the Lee case with government acting as airport terminal proprietor-is
the driving force behind these changes in First Amendment
jurisprudence.
In anticipation of Supreme Court review, the Second Circuit further
elaborated its reliance on Kokinda.168 Lee's restatement of Kokinda pro-
vides a useffil summary of many of the changes to the traditional public
forum doctrine described in this Article:
We read the plurality opinion of Justice O'Connor to distinguish
between passageways or other facilities that exist solely to facilitate
the public's carrying on of a particular endeavor-subway or air
travel for example-and passageways or facilities that enable the
public to carry out the multitude of purposes persons pursue in
their daily life-the typical Main Street.... [W]here the particular
purpose is guch that the public uses them as a matter of necessity,
162. Lee, 925 F.2d at 579-82.
163. Id. at 578, 580-82.
164. Id. at 580-82.
165. Id. at 581.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 582.
168. Id. at 581-82. See supra note 13.
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or at least great convenience, we read the plurality opinion to allow
the prohibition of in-person solicitation of funds to prevent disrup-
tion of [the] public.3 9
The Second Circuit interprets Kokinda to redefine the traditional public
forum test according to the purposes behind the existence of particular
public passageways and thoroughfares. Kokinda instructs that public
passageways are not traditional public forums when these purposes are
tied to commercial or private property-like goals.
170
IV. Protecting the Traditional Public Forum Concept: An
Alternative Approach to United States v. Kokinda
The public forum paradigm is a relatively new development in the
Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. The framework has
come under strong attack from commentators since its formal inception
in Perry in 1983.171 At least four Justices in Kokinda criticize the public
forum doctrines largely because they function as "wooden" pigeonholes
into which a variety of public places either fit or do not.' 72 As one com-
mentator has written, the Court's "myopic focus on formalistic labels...
serves only to distract attention from the real stakes in these disputes."' 7 3
These commentators believe that the public forum categories ignore al-
most entirely the competing interests and social value of speakers utiliz-
ing public spaces to convey their messages.
174
Thus, it is not surprising that the public forum doctrines are in a
state of flux. The sharp contrast between the visions of the traditional
public forum in Frisby and Kokinda, both written by Justice O'Connor
within a span of two years, is a vivid example of this doctrinal instability.
Within a larger context, Kokinda stands as an example of the Court's
169. Lee, 925 F.2d at 581-82.
170. Id. at 581 ("It is true that the various commercial establishments and art exhibits at
the three airports create an appearance similar to a busy downtown street. It is also true,
however, that the facilities in question exist solely to accommodate the needs of air travelers,
just as the post office and sidewalk in Kokinda existed solely to facilitate the use of postal
services.").
171. See Dienes, supra note 56; Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak,.The Misleading Na-
ture of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA.
L. REv. 1219 (1984); Post, supra note 17; Stone, supra note 54; TRIBE, supra note 45, § 12-24.
172. These are Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens. United States v.
Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3129 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Geoffrey R. Stone, Justice
Brennan and the Freedom of Speech: A First Amendment Odyssey, 139 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1333,
1350 (1991), for the observation that Justice Brennan's dissent in Kokinda is an example of his
long-standing criticism of the formalized public forum framework.
173. Stone, supra note 54, at 93.
174. See, e.g., Dienes, supra note 56, at 110; TRIBE, supra note 45, § 12-24, at 986-97, 993
n.41.
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difficult struggle to forge categorical definitions suitable for an extraordi-
narily broad range of public places. Kokinda may indicate that formal-
ized public forum analysis, just years in the making, is evolving from
formal categories into a series of fact-specific decisions lacking clear
guidelines.
In the midst of this uncertainty, Kokinda indisputably moves to-
ward a more restrictive conception of the traditional public forum. Lee
demonstrates that at least one federal circuit court of appeals explicitly
agrees with this assessment. 175 Private property-based rationales are the
driving force behind this change because it entails fusing the designated
forum test into traditional public forum analysis. 176 Kokinda justified its
public forum determination largely on the basis of protecting the effi-
ciency of proprietary fimctions of government. 177 The interests of speak-
ers and First Amendment values are severely compromised in the process
because incorporating a subjective purpose component into the tradi-
tional public forum test threatens its future vitality as a category.
171
175. Other courts have implicitly followed Kokinda's more restrictive traditional public
forum test. In Sentinel Communications Co. v. Watts, 936 F.2d 1189, 1201-05 (11th Cir.
1991), the court held that interstate highway rest areas are nonpublic forums. Applying
Kokinda, the court analyzed the traditional public forum status of the rest areas according to
government's subjective intent behind constructing them. The court reasoned that "rest areas
have never existed independently of the Interstate [highway] System; they are optional append-
ages that are intended, as part of the System, to facilitate safe and efficient travel by motorists
along the System's highways. At the outset, then, it seems clear to us that rest areas are
nontraditional public fora." Id. at 1203 (emphasis added).
See also Longo v. United States Postal Serv., 761 F. Supp. 220 (D. Conn. 1991) (holding
that post office sidewalks are nonpublic forums); International Caucus of Labor Comm. v,
Maryland Dep't of Tratsp., 745 F. Supp. 323, 328 (D. Md. 1990) (citing government's purpose
behind construction of interior walkways within the Maryland Motor Vehicle Agency build-
ings as a factor in its holding that these walkways are nonpublic forums).
176. See Nadine Strossen, Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz: A Roadblock to
Meaningful Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Rights, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 285, 376-81"
(1991), for the argument that Kokinda's "distortion" of the public forum doctrine is part of a
larger trend in recent Supreme Court decisions to "overemphasize an egalitarian concept of
relative protection at the expense of a libertarian concept of absolute protection."
The author's analysis of Kokinda turns on the assumption that public access to govern-
ment property is the critical factor in traditional public forum analysis. While access helps
illuminate an objective assessment of traditional and historical uses of property, it is by no
means the determinative factor under the Hague test. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461
U.S. 171, 177 (despite the holding that sidewalks in front of the Supreme Court are traditional
public forums, the Court observed that "[publicly owned or operated property does not be-
come a 'public forum' simply because members of the public are permitted to come and go at
will"); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976), ("the principle that whenever members of the
public are permitted freely to visit a place owned or operated by the Government, then that
place becomes a 'public forum' for purposes'of the First Amendment... has never existed, and
does not exist now").
177. See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
178. See United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3125 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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The traditional public forum is the only type of public place where
speech receives heightened First Amendment protection irrespective of
government consent or attempts to interfere.179 These "safe zones"
where citizens can speak out protected by a First Amendment shield
against government reprisal have an important historical legacy in pro-
moting democratic change."' 0 Furthermore, as Professor Harry Kalven,
Jr. argued in his seminal article, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v.
Louisiana,
... in an open democratic society the streets, the parks, and other
public places are an important facility for public discussion and
political process. They are in brief a public forum that the citizen
can commandeer; the generosity and empathy with which such fa-
cilities are made is an index of freedom.""1
For these reasons, Kokinda's reliance on the notion of government's role
as a proprietor in reducing the scope of the traditional public forum test
should be evaluated carefully.
Protecting government when it acts in its "proprietary capacity" at
the expense of the Hague traditional public forum test is an ill-conceived
way to accommodate the competing interests in speakers' First Amend-
ment liberties and in government efficiency."' Distinguishing between
traditional governmental and proprietary functions is itself problematic.
The Court itself recently acknowledged how unprincipled and "unwork-
able" this distinction is in reviewing its confused legacy in the Ninth
Amendment intergovernmental tax immunity and Tenth Amendment
"traditional governmental functions" doctrines. 8 3 Resurrecting the gov-
ernmental/proprietary distinction as a rationale for constricting the
scope of the traditional public forum doctrine in the future would no
doubt prove as unprincipled for First Amendment jurisprudence as it has
for other areas of federal constitutional law.'8 4
179. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., David Goldberger, A Reconsideration of Cox v. New Hampshire: Can Dem-
onstrators be Required to Pay the Costs of Using America's Public Forums, 62 TEx. L. REv.
403, 403-04 (1983) ("[d]uring the 1940's, Jehovah's Witnesses proselytized on the streets ....
[d]uring the 1950's and early 1960's, the civil rights movement brought its cause to the atten-
tion of an entire nation by marching and demonstrating in streets and parks,... [and] ...
[d]uring the late 1960's and early 1970's, antiwar protestors used streets, sidewalks, and parks
to demand a change in American policy toward the war in Vietnam."). See supra note 74 and
accompanying text.
181. Kalven, supra note 18, at 11-12.
182. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3119.
183. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 539-47 (1985).
184. See Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3130 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting the "blurry con-
cept of government qua proprietor" as figuring into the plurality decision). Cf Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (indicating in dictum the unresolved question
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Kokinda illustrates this problem of characterization. Congress'
power to create the United States Postal Service is derived from Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution which states, "The Congress shall have
Power... To Establish Post Offices and Post Roads." 85 Known as the
Postal Clause, this grant of constitutional authority designates postal ac-
tivities as an enumerated function of the federal government.186 Begin-
ning in 1792187 and culminating in 1845,188 Congress passed statutes
pursuant to the Postal Clause formalizing a "monopoly over the carriage
of letters in and from the United States."18 9 Indeed, federal control of
postal activities has been a uniquely "sovereign function"' 190 since the
Articles of Confederation period.1 91 Clearly, operation of post offices is
as much of a traditional governmental function as it is a proprietary
activity.
Precedent for minimizing First Amendment judicial review when
government appears to act like a proprietor is virtually nonexistent.
Kokinda erroneously suggested that "long-settled principle[s]" of First
Amendment case law permit a lower level of judicial review when
government acts as a "proprietor... manag[ing] [its] internal opera-
tion[s]...." 1 92 Kokinda cited the 1961 decision Cafeteria and Restau-
rant Workers v. McElroy for this proposition. However, McElroy is a
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause case and did not concern the First
whether a municipality owning a bandshell might have a "proprietary right to select perform-
ances and control their quality").
185. U.S. CoNsT., art. I., § 8.
186. Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732 (1878); see TRIBE, supra note 45, § 5-11, at 326.
187. Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 14, 1 Stat. 236; see Board of Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 485 U.S. 589, 594 (1988).
188. Act of March 3, 1845, ch. 43, § 9, 5 Stat. 735 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1696); see
United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 118, 123 (1981).
189. Air Courier Conference of Am. v. American Postal Workers Union, 111 S. Ct. 913,
915 (1991). The postal monopoly statutes are codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1699 (1988) and
39 U.S.C. §§ 601-606 (1988).
190. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. at 122.
191. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Cal, 485 U.S. at 594; see Act of Oct. 18, 1782,
reprinted in 23 J. CONTINENTAL CONG. 672-673 (G. Hunt ed. 1914); see Articles of Confeder-
ation, art. IX ("The United States in Congress assembled shall also have the sole and exclusive
right and power of ... establishing and regulating post-offices ... throughout the United
States.").
192. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3119 (quoting Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961)). Kokinda quotes McElroy out of context. The passage in McElroy
quoted in Kokinda reads-without ellipses-as follows: "Moreover, the governmental function
operating here was not the power to regulate or license, as lawmaker, an entire trade or profes-
sion, or to control an entire branch of private business, but, rather, as proprietor, to manage
the internal operation of an important federal military establishment." Iad at 896 (emphasis
added).
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Amendment. 19 3 Kokinda also cited the 1971 decision Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights, in which a divided Court held that the First Amendment
permitted a ban on political advertising on the interior spaces of public
buses.19 4 While the Lehman plurality mentioned the commercial role of
a municipality in operating buses, a five-vote majority was reached exclu-
sively under the reasoning that bus riders were "captive viewers or listen-
ers" where political advertising would be "forced" on them.'95 Kokinda
provides no authority for its government-as-proprietor argument under
the First Amendment other than the questionable citation of McElroy
and the plurality view in Lehman.
Most importantly, Kokinda's injection of a government-purpose test
into "the traditional public forum calculus is an unnecessarily excessive
way to protect government's interests in managing its property. The ob-
jective criteria of the Hague public forum concept insure that a histori-
cally significant class of public places will remain beyond the reach of
government attempts to interfere with speech. 196 Kokinda threatens to
make the traditional public forum virtually indistinguishable from the
designated and limited-purpose forum categories by removing Hague's
objective look at public places. Government consent would be a prereq-
uisite for a finding that any public place is a public forum. Courts can
achieve a balance less threatening to the status of traditional public fo-
rums by shifting the focus of judicial inquiry more toward the time,
place, and manner of expression at hand.
As argued in Parts II and III, Kokinda emphasized its concern that
solicitation "[would] impede the normal flow of traffic" at post office
sidewalks because of solicitor "confrontations" with patrons.197 The
Postal Service justified its regulation as a way to prevent disruption of
postal business.'98 The crucial factor to the Kokinda Court was the per-
ceived secondary effect of solicitation on patron access-not with the
substance of various political, religious, or charitable messages that
might be conveyed through solicitation. Given this concern, the Postal
193. McElroy decided whether a civilian employee working at a United States Navy instal-
lation could have her security access badge revoked and employment terminated for security
reasons without a hearing. 367 U.S. at 886.
194. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
195. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring);
see United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3131 n.4 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see
also TRIBE, supra note 45, § 15-18, at 1409. See Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audi-
ence Doctrine, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 85 (1991), for a critique of the captive audience
doctrine.
196. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
197. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3123. See supra notes 92, 148-50 and accompanying text.
198. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3123.
192
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Service could have issued time, place, and manner regulations against
solicitation in order to protect customer access to the sidewalk and post
office door. 199 The superior feature of time, place, and manner regula-
tions is that courts need not pass on the public forum status of public
property when reviewing the regulations' constitutionality under the
First Amendment.2 °°
In Heffron, regulations limiting the solicitation, distribution, and
sale of literature to designated booths within the Minnesota State Fair
grounds were upheld as content-neutral, reasonable time, place and man-
ner regulations. 201 Heiffron found that the regulations were reasonable
and served the "substantial" interest of the state in protecting the "or-
derly movement and control" of individuals at the fair.2" 2 Similarly, the
Postal Service could designate areas along its sidewalks, or in the parking
lot adjacent to the sidewalk, for solicitation in such a way that customer
access to the post office would not be impeded.20 3
Heffron-type time, place, and manner regulations offer a preferable
alternative to the Kokinda model because they accommodate both the
199. As stated in Part I, government can issue reasonable content-neutral time, place, and
manner of expression regulations that are "narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmen-
tal interest, ... leav[ing] open ample alternative channels for communication of the informa-
tion," regardless of the status of the forum. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989) (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984)). See
supra note 55 and accompanying text.
200. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 ("[olur cases make clear.., that even in a public forum the
government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected
speech .... ."). See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
See William E. Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little People, and the Supreme Court: The
Doctrine of Time, Place, and Manner Regulations of Expression, 54 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 756
(1986), for a critical examination of the Court's application of the time, place, and manner
standard of judicial review.
201. Heffron v. ISKCON, 452 U.S. 640, 649 (1981). The regulation was content-neutral
because it applied "evenhandedly to all who wish to distribute and sell written materials or to
solicit funds." Id. For similar reasons, the Kokinda plurality held that the Postal Service
regulation banning solicitation was content-neutral. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3124. Cf. Ward,
491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 293) ("Govern-
ment regulation of expressive activity is content-neutral so long as it is :iustified without refer-
ence to the content of the regulated speech.' ").
Justice Kennedy, concurring with the plurality on this point, interpreted.the Postal Ser-
vice regulation as a valid time, place, and manner provision. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3125-26
(Kennedy, J., concurring). However, Justice Kennedy stands alone on the Court in his belief
that the Postal Service's categorical ban on solicitation is narrowly tailored. Id. at 3134-35.
See infra note 205.
202. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 650.
203. The Postal Service already designates interior bulletin boards for public notices. See
supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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interests of speakers and government. 2°4 The functional standard of re-
view for time, place, and manner regulations takes into account govern-
ment's purposes, and public uses and access to a forum without
categorically denying access to classes of speakers. Moreover, the nar-
row tailoring requirement, of the standard polices against excessively
broad restrictions at the forum.2"5 In sharp contrast, the Kokinda public
forum methodology provides an all-or-nothing result for speakers'
claims. Under Kokinda, the forum is classified as a threshold matter on
the basis of government's purposes behind maintaining a public place.0 6
204. See ISKCON v. Lee, 925 F.2d 576, 586-87 (2d Cir. 1991) (Oakes, C.J., dissenting),
cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3464 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1992) (No. 91-155), for a similar argument that
the Port Authority could have issued time, place, and manner of expression regulations that
"for example, require permits or badges for solicitors, or that limit the number of solicitors
permitted, or that restrict the locations within the terminal buildings where solicitors may
conduct their activities .... "
The Port Authority has suspended enforcement of its solicitation and literature distribu-
tion bans until the Lee case is fully adjudicated. Instead, the Port Authority has established an
informal set of procedures to control the secondary effects of solicitation similar to those rec-
ommended by Chief Judge Oakes. Solicitors in the building are told to remain in designated
areas outside the main pedestrian walkways so as not to interfere with traffic flows. They are
also instructed to wear identification tags. Security personnel limit the number of solicitors
each morning based on a first-come, first-served sign-up sheet. Solicitors will be expelled from
the building pursuant to the regulation prohibiting solicitation if they do not follow these
'rules."
Similarly styled time, place, and manner restrictions against solicitation and distribution
of literature in public airport concourses have been upheld for use in the Atlanta International
Airport, ISKCON v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809, 828-30 (5th Cir. 1979), and in the Miami Interna-
tional Airport, International Caucus of Labor Comms. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 724 F.
Supp. 917 (S.D. Fla 1989).
205. Ward, 491 U.S. at 797-800, revised the narrow tailoring requirement by stating that
the regulation need not be the least-restrictive or least-intrusive means of achieving the govern-
mental interest at stake. Rather, the means chosen must not be "substantially broader than
necessary to achieve the government's interest .... ." Id. at 800.
Several commentators argue that the Ward narrow tailoring test is "quite close to the
rational basis applied to regulations that do not affect fundamental rights .... because it does
not require the least-restrictive form of government regulation. Susan H. Williams, Content
Discrimination and the FirstAmendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 644 (1991); accord Richard
B. Saphire, Reconsidering the Public Forum Doctrine, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 739, 784-88 (1991).
Kokinda refutes this interpretation of the Ward test. A majority of the Justices in Kokinda
agreed that the solicitation ban was content-neutral. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3124, 3126 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring); see supra note 201. The government asked the Court to uphold the ban
as a content-neutral time, place, and manner of expression regulation. Brief for Petitioner
United States of America at Section C, United States v. Kokinda 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990) (No.
88-2031). If the Ward narrow tailoring requirement were as deferential to government author-
ity as these commentators contend, the Court could have upheld the solicitation ban exclu-
sively on this basis. However, only Justice Kennedy, concurring in the result in Kokinda,
argued that the Post Office's categorical ban on solicitation is narrowly tailored under Ward.
Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3125-26 (Kennedy, J. concurring); see supra notes 104-05 and 201 and
accompanying text.
206. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3119. See supra Parts II and III.
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This methodology provides no opportunity for balancing the interests of
speakers because it focuses exclusively on government's designs for its
property.
The Hague traditional public forum test could remain intact if gov-
ernment were obligated to fashion time, place, and manner regulations
for public places like post office sidewalks and airport terminal lobbies.
Under this view, an exterior post office sidewalk and an airport terminal
concourse would qualify as traditional public forums because govern-
ment's subjective purposes behind building and maintaining them would
not be factors in the analysis. Thus, regulations banning solicitation on
postal sidewalks and in airport terminal lobbies would be invalid under
the First Amendment. However, government would still have the power
to curb the perceived secondary effects of solicitors on post office or air-
port patrons by issuing time, place, and manner of expression
restrictions.2 °7
Whether Kokinda's interpretation of the First Amendment will
have far-reaching effects on a speaker's access to various public places
remains for future cases. Lee, by creating a conflict among federal circuit
courts over the public forum status of airport terminals, provides the
Supreme Court with a forthcoming opportunity to reexamine its legal
analysis in Kokinda.208 Since the Court has granted a writ of certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Lee,
newly appointed Justices David Souter and Clarence Thomas are likely
to cast deciding votes among a Court sharply divided over the future of
the traditional public forum.20 9
207. In Hague, Justice Roberts alluded to this balance by arguing that expressive activities
at streets and parks must be "exercised in subordination to the general comfort and conven-
ience, and in consonance with peace and good order .... " Hague v. Committee for Indus.
Org., 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939). See supra note 16 and accompanying text. See also supra notes
197-98 and 204 and accompanying text.
208. See Lee, 925 F.2d 576, cert granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3464 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1992) (No. 91-
155). The Court consolidated ISKCON's petition concerning the Second Circuit's reversal of
the district court judgment invalidating the restriction on solicitation with the Port Authority's
cross-petition concerning the Second Circuit's affirmance of the district court judgment invali-
dating the restriction on the distribution of literature. See also supra notes 13, 158-59 and
accompanying text.
209. See State v. Hodgkiss, 565 A.2d 1059 (N.H. 1989) (upholding an ordinance prohibit-
ing encumbrances on public sidewalks against a First Amendment challenge) for Justice Sou-
ter's application of the First Amendment public forum doctrines while presiding as a Justice of
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. See National Treasury Employees Union v. United
States, 927 F.2d 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (affirming district court's denial of a preliminary in-
junction against enforcement of the Ethics Reform Act pending a First Amendment challenge)
for Justice Clarence Thomas's only reported decision involving the First Amendment while
presiding as a Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.
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